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Steven Swarbrick

The Life Aquatic: Liquid Poetics and
the Discourse of Friendship in The
Faerie Queene
From Michel de Montaigne’s essay “Of Friendship” to Jacques
Derrida’s rearticulation of the former in The Politics of Friendship,
scholars both early modern and modern have sought ways to
address the fluid co-mixture of bodies from which the discourse
of friendship can and does emerge. More recently still, new materialist thinkers of ontology have begun to shift our attention
to the ways both human and nonhuman bodies inter-animate
in the making of political, interpersonal, and artistic life worlds.
Together with these investigations, I argue that an aquacentric
account of relation is necessary to think the subject of friendship in Spenser’s epic. Beginning with Spenser’s queer address
to Ralegh in Book III of The Faerie Queene and continuing
through Book IV, I argue that Spenser reimagines the discourse
of friendship in terms of a liquid, transcorporeal poetics, one
that not only takes to its logical extreme humoral descriptions
of bodies as conduits for liquids and passions but also importantly reworks human-exceptionalist readings of ontology in
Spenser’s epic.
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SPENSER STUDIES
So to the sea we came; the sea? that is
A world of waters . . .
. . . and in those wandring stremes
Seek waies vnknowne.
—Edmund Spenser1

N

ear the end of Book IV of The Faerie Queene, Edmund Spenser
writes:

O What an endlesse worke haue I in hand,
To count the seas abundant progeny,
Whose fruitfull seede farre passeth those in land,
And also those which wonne in th’azure sky? (IV.12.1)2

A modesty topos, to be sure: Spenser, having just recounted the “seas abundant progeny” in the previous canto, in what is without doubt a bravura
performance of the poet’s genealogical cum thalassological knowledge and
poetic mastery, begins Canto 12 less as a mariner in command of the “seas
abundant progeny” and more as a courtier and lover avowing his shortcomings before the sea’s inimitable “seede.” The “fruitfull seede” that most
confounds Spenser’s numerical qua metrical “count,” both here and elsewhere (as we shall soon see), is, of course, Venus, both goddess of beauty
and fertility and figure for the errant sexuality of the seas:
That Venus of the fomy sea was bred;
For that the seas by her are most augmented.
Witnesse th’exceeding fry, which there are fed,
And wonderous sholes, which may of none be red.
Then blame me not, if I haue err’d in count
Of Gods, of Nymphs, of riuer yet vnred:
For though their numbers do much more surmount,
Yet all those same were there, which erst I did recount. (IV.12.2)
Venus, figure of life-giving fertility, of the sea’s autoerotic excess, disturbs
Spenser’s numerical “count,” and so also, for a moment, interrupts the measure or metric of his poetic rendering, exposing the errancy (“err’d”) internal to both the life represented (in this case, the sea) and Spenser’s own
poetic making. Venus augments the seas (“the seas by her are most aug-
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mented”), meaning that she multiplies, grows, swells (the Latin augmentare means “to increase”) the already “abundant” oceans, “th’exceeding fry,”
and the “wonderous sholes,” which, being too many, “may of none be red.”
Venus is a figure of love en abyme—a marine love which, as Roland Barthes
reminds us in his lover’s taxonomy, A Lover’s Discourse, most represents
“a craving to be engulfed” (s’abîmer). “The crisis of engulfment,” Barthes
writes, “can come from a wound, but also from a fusion: we die together
from loving each other: an open death, by dilution.”3
The sea-swellings that Venus represents in Spenser’s The Faerie Queene
share this double-edged meaning, which Barthes finds emblematized
in the lover’s outburst (translated from Goethe): “I am engulfed, I succumb.” Venus multiplies life, but she also exceeds it (“their numbers do
much more surmount”). If Spenser’s stated goal in The Faerie Queene is to
fulfill the rota Virgilii by abandoning pastoral life in favor of the martial,
imperial, and territorial thematics of epic, as announced in the first lines
of his poem, “For trumpets sterne to chaunge mine Oaten reeds,” then it
is the fluid, dilute, and engulfing power of Venus, figure not only of the
abyss but of a sexuality that is itself abyssal, that threatens to turn Spenser’s
poem away from the war-machine of epic to the erring-desiring-machine
of romance—a non-totalizable assemblage in which every part melts (yes,
melts, we will return to this word later) with desire: “Gods . . . nymphs . . .
riuer[s] yet vnred” (IV.12.2).
The following essay embarks upon two questions concerning friendship
in Spenser’s The Faerie Queene. The first question asks: what propinquity
of desire links amity to the sea, such that, to invoke Foucault, friendship
(amicitas, or, in a related sense, amare, “to love”) becomes a way of life in
Spenser’s allegory? And second: whence this way of life such that it undoes
the very category of “the human,” indeed of the self-same human (homo)
whose face, Foucault suggests, may someday “be erased, like a face drawn
in sand at the edge of the sea”?4
In recent decades, early modern scholars’ engagements with the history
of sexuality have shifted attention to the somaticized and highly affective
zones of encounter between friends, making the discourse of friendship
a key point of study in early modern accounts of the body, queer sexuality, philology, and political structure.5 A central feature of nearly all of
this work has been a greater attention to crossings and exchanges—to what
Jeffrey Masten describes as the “interchangeability and absolute likeness of
friends.”6 Despite bridging older divisions within the history of sexuality,
however, many of these studies retain a prior division, one that separates the
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domain of culture from that of nature and confines critical work to studying cultural production and the forms of communication it makes possible.
Thus, when Masten describes the literal interchangeability of male friends
in terms of “the fungible, humoral body, a conduit for liquids, humors,
passions, and so forth,” this liquid body remains wholly human—a site of
philological and cultural investigation separate from the natural world.7 In
the wake of ecocriticism and posthumanist theories of the body, however,
this separation is increasingly untenable and in recent years scholars have
produced work that not only trespasses cultural divisions but also that of
culture from nature.8 Following this renaturalizing trend,9 my goal in this
essay is to bring together early modern studies, ecocritical studies, and the
history of sexuality so as to think through Foucault’s admonition to treat
friendship not as a process of discovery or mutual recognition but rather
as a way of life—that is, a rethinking of how we define and value “life” itself.
From Michel de Montaigne’s essay “Of Friendship” to Jacques Derrida’s
rearticulation of the former in The Politics of Friendship, scholars both early
modern and modern have sought ways to address the fluid co-mixture of
bodies from which the discourse of friendship can and does emerge. More
recently still, new materialist thinkers of ontology have begun to shift our
attention to the ways both human and nonhuman bodies inter-animate in
the making of political, interpersonal, and artistic life worlds.10 Together
with these investigations, I argue that an aquacentric account of relation is
necessary to think the subject of friendship in Spenser’s epic.11 Beginning
with Spenser’s queer address to Ralegh in Book III of The Faerie Queene and
continuing through Book IV, I argue that Spenser reimagines the discourse
of friendship in terms of a liquid, transcorporeal poetics, one that not only
takes to its logical extreme Masten’s description of bodies as “conduits for
liquids, humors, [and] passions” but also importantly reworks human-exceptionalist readings of ontology in Spenser’s epic.
The first section develops my understanding of Spenser’s liquid poetics, focusing in particular on the framing technologies, such as “Venus
looking glas,” that magnify and make tangible love’s immaterial “seede”
(III.1.8). Following recent scholarly investigations into the ways that specifically Lucretian materiality appears in English Renaissance texts,12 I read
Spenser’s poetics as a way of magnifying the aleatory movements of atoms,
which Lucretius calls “seed.” My claim is that the aleatory movement of
atoms, of matter imperceptible to human sight, gains visibility in Spenser’s
poem predominantly in the form of liquid and erotic conjunctions: of
bodies that “melt” with desire and therefore challenge definitions of hu-
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man being as solid or stable. From there I examine Britomart’s benthic
imaginary in Book III as a precursor to the liquid and lithic love figured
around Marinell and Florimell in the Legend of Friendship. Whereas most
critics tend to read Spenserian ontology as merely allegorical, I argue that
in the case of friendship, the liquid bodies made fungible by early modern vocabularies, affects and desires are not strictly speaking bounded human bodies: Spenser’s liquid poetics foregrounds bodies made richer and
stranger by co-mingling with rivers, waters, and other sea-like bodies. His
is an aesthetics open to the hospitality of a difference within the self; his
waters know no boundaries.

I. Liquid Poetics
In Book III of The Faerie Queene, Spenser makes of Elizabeth’s chastity a
spur for reflecting on the matter of poetic making. He states:
It falls me here to write of Chastity,
The fayrest vertue, far aboue the rest;
For which what needes me fetch from Faery
Forreine ensamples, it to haue exprest?
Sith it is shrined in my Soueraines brest. (III.Proem.1)
In order to represent chastity, Spenser must represent the inner life of the
queen, the inner temple or sanctum of her heart. And yet, this task of mimesis is itself impossible. As Spenser goes on, he acknowledges that “so
liuely in each perfect part” is his sovereign’s heart that neither “liuing art . .
. / Nor life-resembling pencill it can paynt”:
All were it Zeuxis or Praxiteles:
His dædale hand would faile, and greatly faynt,
And her perfections with his error taynt:
Ne Poets witt, that passeth Painter farre
In picturing the parts of beauty daynt,
So hard a workemanship aduenture darre,
For fear through want of words her excellence to marre.
								 (III.Proem.2)
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Neither the painter’s “dædale hand” nor the poet’s “witt” can represent the
queen’s inner “perfections,” for the “pourtrait of her hart” exceeds any “liuing art.” What is noteworthy, however, is that the failure to fit matter and
meaning does not end in allegorical violence, as Gordon Teskey’s theory of
allegory would suggest,13 but rather makes of Spenser’s allegory a tool for
magnifying and thus visualizing nonhuman modes of self-fashioning.
Take the word “marre,” for example. A word steeped in polyvalent and
diachronic meanings (among them, notably, to impair, to ruin—as Spenser
writes in Book III: “And striuing, fit to make, I feare doe marre” [III.2.3]),
“marre” doubles as a shibboleth for the agency and transcorporeality of the
sea. From the Old English mere and the Middle English marre, as well as
post-classical Latin mare, we gather from this etymological stew an alternative account of what it means to “marre” the queen. Writing in reference
to his friend Ralegh, whose pseudonym “Ocean” provides the material and
semantic substrate of Spenser’s liquefacient verse, Spenser characterizes
the act of marring as a kind of bodily “melting”:
But if in liuing colours, and right hew,
Thy selfe thou couet to see pictured,
Who can it doe more liuely, or more trew,
Then that sweete verse, with Nectar sprinckeled,
In which a gracious seruaunt pictured
His Cynthia, his heauens fayrest light?
That with his melting sweetnes rauished,
And with the wonder of her beames bright,
My sences lulled are in slomber of delight. (III.Proem.4)
In Spenser’s poem, the liquid dynamics of male-male friendship detailed
by Masten ebb and flow in relation to the paradox of Elizabeth’s “chaste”
pleasure, a pleasure portrayed by Ralegh not as singular, chaste, or inviolable virginity but as “melting sweetnes.” Ralegh not only welcomes the
oceanic feeling of bodies melting into other bodies, he turns the mirror of
narcissistic indifference against itself, revealing not just the specularized
Other of the masculine epic subject but the otherness internal to all subject
“positions.” In Ralegh’s hands, the marine love (mare) that threatened to
“marre” Spenser’s poetic count not once, but twice, returns in the image of
Elizabeth qua Venus, figure of the errant sexuality of the seas.
By abandoning the poet’s “humble quill” in favor of the refractive powers of the allegorist’s oblique “mirrours,” Spenser transforms the
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narcissistic self-assertion of epic conquest to the recursivity and reconciliation of friendship. In mirroring Ralegh (who mirrors the queen), Spenser
himself performs such a mis-en-abyme and exhorts his queen to do the
same, and therefore to recognize the instability and porousness of her own
sovereign subjectivity: “Ne let his fayrest Cynthia refuse, / In mirrours
more then one her selfe to see” (III.Proem.5).
In the Letter to Ralegh, Spenser acknowledges that many readers will
find “displeasaunt” his “Methode” of using “Allegoricall devices,” which
are “clowdily enwrapped” at best.14 In the lines above, however, he signals
an alternative definition whereby the very artifice of allegory, understood
technically as a play of mirrors, enables him to render the queen “in liuing
colours, and right hew.” The paradox is that this “liuing art” is in fact the
product of an inhuman apparatus. The poem, figured as a kind of mirror, makes visible a life inaccessible to human sight. Spenser cannot represent the queen’s inner virtue, but an apparatus such as allegory provides
the optical illusion necessary to create a living poetry, one “clowdily enwrapped”—and therefore one that enacts at the level of form the pleasures
as well as the frustrations of “clowdily” defined subjective and ontological
borders.
Daniel Tiffany describes this conjunction between poetic iconography
and scientific apparatus as being the very crux of “philosophical materialism,” from Democritus’s atom through the history of modern science,
wherein “inquiries into the nature of material substance rely fundamentally on images that do not bear witness to empirical entities, but rather serve
as models of unobservable phenomena.”15 For Tiffany, “the foundation of
material substance is intelligible to us, and therefore appears to be real,
only if we credit the imaginary pictures we have composed of it.”16 Hence
“the forms of mediation and imagination proper to . . . poetry begin to
resemble the tools and practices of science—especially, as in physics, when
it is a question of depicting unobservable phenomena.”17 Both science and
poetry proceed by attributing corporeal qualities to events imperceptible
to human sight. In this sense, the matter of scientific observation is never
quite distinct from the matter of poetic fashioning.
Following Tiffany, I want to suggest that the verb “to marre,” far from
being an idle pun in my usage, speaks directly to the liquid dynamics oft
visualized in Spenser’s fashioning of virtuous subjects. In other words, by
drawing our attention to the failure of his allegorical “Methode” to make
vivid things inscrutable to human sight, Spenser not only embraces the
pictorial powers of the scientific apparatus but also imagines his allegorical
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method as a tool for magnifying the capacity of friendship to reinvent “life”
as we know it. As James Kuzner explains, “in Spenser’s epic . . . friends
respect and reinforce each other’s boundaries but also disregard and dissolve them.”18 This tendency to dissolve individual boundaries surfaces in
the following lines, wherein Spenser admonishes Cupid, “thou dred infant, Venus dearling doue,” to “chase imperious feare” from “my soueraigne
Queene” and “vse of awfull Maiestie remoue”:
In sted thereof with drops of melting loue,
Deawd with ambrosiall kisses, by thee gotten
From thy sweete smyling mother from aboue,
Sprinckle her heart, and haughtie courage soften,
That she may hearke to loue, and reade this lesson often.
								 (IV.Proem.5)
Spenser imagines his ideal reader as one open to the “melting loue” that
he previously attributes to Ralegh. Rather than halt his “magnifying” lens,
he turns to Cupid, beckoning the latter to scatter ambrosial “drops” akin
to Venus’ “fruitfull seede,” so that the image of love, being “fruitfull,” can
multiply. My interest here is in the way Spenser represents love: what do
the fruition and multiplicity of his “Allegoricall devices” depict?
Reid Barbour notes that in early modern depictions of materiality, the
atom was often eroticized: “Mythologized in the person of Cupid, the atom
. . . is made all the more complex insofar as atomic desire risks lust and
anarchy.”19 Francis Bacon, for example, “maintains that the ancients allegorized the properties of the atom in the nudity, archery, infancy, and
blindness of Cupid.”20 Lucretius no doubt provides precedent for this allegorical view: not only are his atoms blind, but Venus, mother of Cupid,
is the muse of his poem. Spenser’s invocation of Venus’ “fruitfull seede”
in Book IV shows a keen awareness of this allegorical interpretation of
the atom. What’s more, his emphasis on the instruments of visualization,
making repeated reference to his own poem as a tool of magnification, as
when Britomart, “wondrous glad,” softens her martial demeanor at hearing
“her Love so highly magnifyde” by Redcrosse’s speech, begs us to think of
Spenser’s allegory in Tiffany’s terms as a poetic apparatus, a tool capable of
“giving life and ‘passion’ to insensible things” (III.2.11).21
Between the 1590 and 1596 editions of The Faerie Queene, the images of love’s virtue do indeed multiply according to the refractive angle
of Spenser’s poetic apparatus: from the images of Cynthia, Gloriana, and
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Belphœbe in the Proem to Book III, to the image of Venus evoked by
Britomart’s “looking glas.” Spenser’s multiplication of life’s images are as
numerous as Venus’ innumerable “seede”—and as volatile. For the “lust
and anarchy” that Bacon discerns in the atom finds its expression in the
“drops of melting loue” that Spenser twice attributes to poetic fashioning.
If, in Spenser’s hands, poetry is an instrument of magnification, then the
insensible object of his gaze—atomic desire—appears most often and most
powerfully as a kind of melting carried out allegorically as an erosion of
bodily boundaries by liquid forces. To follow Kuzner’s remarks above, it
does not suffice to read Spenser’s “open subjects” as always already human; for the power to practice non-sovereignty in relation to others—via
friendship—is as much a power to co-assemble with inhuman forces. To
imagine “open subjects,” we need think not only of what it means to fail
at self-fashioning—“to marre,” as Spenser says; but also how such failure
enables us to visualize a much broader cosmopolity beyond the strictly
human community, to see, along with Foucault, the human face erased at
the edge of the sea.22
In the following section, I examine the relationship between poetic iconography and material description through the particular lens of
Britomart’s benthic imagination. Dan Brayton usefully defines the “benthic imagination” in the context of Shakespeare studies as the figurative
construction of human life as a sea voyage. The ocean according to Brayton
serves as “(1) a mirror of human ontology, culture, and civilization; (2) the
space of transit, an undomesticated boundary between realms, a threat to
cosmic and social order; (3) the arena of providence; and (4) a transitional
space between the supernatural and the protoscientific.”23 Each of these
definitions will come to bear on my reading of the Legend of Friendship,
and of Marinell and Florimell in particular. For now, I turn to Britomart in
Book III to show that the image of human life reflected by the sea not only
mirrors human ontology, as Brayton suggests, but much more troublingly
erodes and consumes that image, producing an oceanic subjectivity open
to the pain and suffering of others.
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II. Britomart’s Benthic Imaginary

Thus far I have argued that the focus on fashioning in Spenser’s Faerie
Queene can and should be read in terms of the technical apparatuses figured throughout the poem, which give to the reader’s eye a semblance of
events imperceptible to human sight. These semblances are neither static
nor mimetic, for what they “represent” are not objects or things but rather
happenings or becomings: from the Latin sembler, meaning to gather or
assemble. Semblances visualize the movement of poetic making (poiesis)
by making that very movement of creation the object of poetic sight. In so
doing, they enable us “to see” bodies available only at the scale of the poetic
apparatus—what Spenser calls his “Allegoricall devices” or “frame”—assembling and disassembling before our very eyes. Such shifts in scale—
from the imperceptible to the perceptible and back—result in disaggregating movements at the level of the human body, as the image of the
human body begins to dissolve in relation to other assembled images, such
as Spenser’s “melting” in sensuous “delight” before the image of Ralegh’s
Cynthia.
In Book III, we see another such image, this time mixed not with the
affect of “delight” but with the affect of “melancholy” and despair. Here,
Britomart gazes upon a mirror fashioned by the “Magitien Merlin,” whose
“deepe science” produced a “looking glasse” capable of “shew[ing] in perfect sight / What euer thing was in the world contained” (III.2.18-19).
Britomart sees in this “world of glas” the “semblant of a knight, / Whose
shape or person yet [she] never saw,” but whose image, she remarks, “Hath
me subjected to loues cruell law” (III.2.19, 38):
The Damzell well did vew his Personage,
And liked well, ne further fastned not,
But went her way; ne her vnguilty age
Did weene, vnwares, that her vnlucky lot
Lay hidden in the bottome of the pot;
Of hurt vnwist most daunger doth redound:
But the false Archer, which that arrow shot
So slyly, that she did not feele the wound,
Did smyle full smoothly at her weetlesse wofull stound.
...
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And if that any drop of slombring rest
Did chaunce to still into her weary spright,
When feeble nature felt her self opprest,
Streight way with dreames, and with fantastick sight
Of dreadful things the same was put to flight,
That oft out of her bed she did astart,
As one with vew of ghastly feends affright:
Tho gan she to renew her former smart,
And thinke of that fayre visage, written in her hart. (III.2.26, 29)
At once an object of human “shape” and a figure of love’s inscrutability, the
“Personage” whom Britomart encounters in the “looking glas,” far from
being a mere representation of a knight, is best understood as a figure of
conjunction. This figure is akin to the “melancholy assemblage,” which, according to Drew Daniel, “joins together its sufferers and its witnesses into
tenuous perceptual communities.”24 Britomart, “weetlesse” of Cupid’s arrow, “thought it was not loue” which she suffered, “but some melancholy”
(III.2.27). The “semblant” that enables her to see “her Loue . . . magnifyde”
also subjects her to the “tyranny” of that love, which is experienced as both
internal compulsion and external force, and thereby questions the boundaries between inside and outside, self and other.
The joining of sufferer and witness that melancholy enables begins from
the moment “fayre Britomart” looks into the “mirrhour playne.” From this
“did grow her first engraffed payne, / Whose root and stalke so bitter yet
did taste” (III.2.17). The image itself entangles seer and seen, just as the
language of vegetable love engrafts foreign bodies. Later the image of “engraffed payne” transforms into an image of writing, as Britomart turns her
gaze inward “to renew her former smart, / And thinke of that fayre visage,
written in her hart” (III.2.29). From the initial graft of “root and stalke” to
its engraved repetition in Britomart’s “hart,” the image takes on the phantasmatic or dreamlike quality that again confounds the objective perception of external objects with internal, subjective experience. Shrouded by
this image-world, this “Night,” in which the “beautie of the shyning skye”
is “Defaste,” and “reft” is the “worldes desired vew,” Britomart suffers
“dreames” and “fantastick sight / Of dreadfull things . . . As one with vew of
ghastly feends affright” (III.2.28-29). Under “loues cruel law,” Britomart’s
“liuely cheare” turns more “dead” than “liuing”; the negative obverse of
Spenser’s herbal metaphor, it loses “Both leafe and fruite, both too vntimely shed” (III.2.31).
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This assemblage of image-plant-heart that joins Britomart’s melancholy
to the wider ecological surround includes forms of relationality that go
beyond the bounded subjectivity that would seem to ground Spenser’s
purported aim of fashioning persons of “vertuous and gentle discipline.”
Britomart’s nurse, Glauce, for example, would seem the exemplary voice
of such disciplinary measures. Reasoning with Britomart, Glauce urges
Britomart not to be carried away by “despeire,” since no love, no matter
how “sore,” is beyond the “salue” of reason (III.2.35). And yet Glauce, too,
suffers melancholy’s web of entangled relationality. Having just “auow[ed]”
to “ease [Britomart’s] griefe, And win [her] will” from the “knowen signes
and passions” of love (III.2.33), Glauce undergoes the same melancholy
transformation: “So hauing sayd, her twixt her armes twaine / Shee
streightly straynd, and colled tenderly, / And euery trembling ioynt, and
euery vaine / Shee softly felt, and rubbed busily” (III.2.34). This compassion—or fellow-feeling—has the effect of taking Britomart out of herself.
Seeing her nurse thus tormented, Britomart exclaims: “Ah Nurse, what
needeth thee to eke my paine? / Is not enough, that I alone doe dye, / But
it must doubled bee with death of twaine?” (III.2.35). The reciprocal grief
shared by Britomart and Glauce makes visible the joining of sufferer and
witness that Daniel attributes to melancholy’s involuntary processes of assembly. Yet while scholars such as Daniel and Gail Kern Paster often use
images of fluidity to describe humoral fluctuations and assemblages, these
liquid bodies are, in the end, always already human bodies.25
Britomart’s melancholy resists this anthro-determinacy. What first
reads as metaphor in the encounter with the mirror soon turns literal as
Britomart, journeying to find her “semblant” knight and “Following the
guydaunce of her blinded guest,” Cupid, arrives at the “seacoast” (III.4.6).
There she reactivates the memory of her inner scar—“her wound she
fedd”—and “to the seacoast at length she her addrest.” This self-consuming
scar—Cupid’s “shot”—“more grieuous bredd” (III.4.6), until inner grief
and outer nature become mutually expressive:
Tho hauing vewd a while the surges hore,
That gainst the craggy clifts did loudly rore,
And in their raging surquedry disdayned,
That the fast earth affronted them so sore,
And their deuouring couetize restraynd,
Thereat she sighed deepe, and after thus complayned. (III.4.7)
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Inner “deepe” and outer “deepe”—self-consuming “wound” and “earth”consuming “surges”—change places. The sea’s “deuouring” currents not
only mirror Britomart’s “deep engord . . . hart” but also magnify and deterritorialize her physical body, remapping the topography of her “hart”
away from the fixed body and the land’s “craggy clifts” to the disassembling
movements of the “sea . . . and tempestuous griefe” (III.4.8). In Britomart’s
benthic imaginary, “deepe” echoes “deepe”:
Huge sea of sorrow, and tempestuous griefe,
Wherein my feeble barke is tossed long,
Far from the hoped hauen of reliefe,
Why doe thy cruel billowes beat so strong,
And thy moyst mountaines each on others throng,
Threatening to swallow vp my fearefull lyfe?
O doe thy cruell wrath and spightfull wrong
At length allay, and stint thy stormy stryfe,
Which in thy troubled bowels raignes, and rageth ryfe.
For els my feeble vessell crazd, and crackt
Through thy strong buffets and outrageous blowes,
Cannot undure, but needes it must be wrackt
On the rough rocks, or on the sandy shallowes,
The whiles that loue it steres, and fortune rowes;
Loue my lewd Pilott hath a restless minde
And fortune Boteswaine no assuraunce knowes,
But saile withouten starres, gainst tyde and winde:
How can they other doe, sith both are bold and blinde? (III.4.8-9)
Here love and fortune take tangible form in the image of life at sea. More
than just a metaphor for Britomart’s inner “deepe,” Spenser uses the
Petrarchan image of a “feeble vessell crazd, and crackt” to illustrate the
material linkage between love and the body’s vulnerability. In so doing,
“stormy stryfe” serves less as a reflection of human ontology than as an
image of material and intertextual assembly. Britomart loses her fixed
identity by dissolving into the sea; although temporary, this moment of
dissolve showcases a fundamental lesson about Spenserian ontology: that
persons—“shadow[s]” as Spenser calls them in the Letter to Ralegh—are
as much a part of the world of material “Accidents” or events as they are
separate from it.

242

SPENSER STUDIES

Britomart’s benthic imaginary testifies to love’s power to fashion oceanic subjects. However, the appearance of Marinell shortly after in Book III
forces us to reckon with a subject whose fame as “loues enimy” runs contrary to the fluid co-mixture of bodies that I have been tracing (III.4.26).
Marinell, as his name indicates, is the product of ontological crossing; a
“Sea-nymphes sonne,” Marinell is both human and inhuman: son of both
man and nymph, grandson to Nereus, and heir to the “riches” of the “deepe”
(III.4.22). Marinell, his mother Cymoent laments, is the very “image” of
herself (III.4.36). And yet Marinell also brings to an abrupt conclusion
Britomart’s liquid reverie, shifting the optic of the poem from the dilute
bodies made visible by melancholy to the martial and agonistic bodies that
we see magnified by friendship in Book IV. Spenser renders this perceptual
shift as a “mist” lifting from Britomart’s visual field:
As when a foggy mist hath ouercast
The face of heuen, and the cleare ayre engroste,
The world in darkenes dwels, till that at last
The watry Southwinde from the seabord coste
Vpblowing, doth disperse the vapour lo’ste,
And pours it selfe forth in a stormy showre;
So the fayre Britomart hauing disclo’ste
Her clowdy care into a wrathfull stowre,
The mist of griefe dissolu’d, did into vengeance powre. (III.4.13)
After seeing “proud Marinell vpon the pretious shore,” Britomart dissolves
her “griefe,” and with it the connection of her fragile “feeble vessell” to the
foreign bodies to which she was “engraffed”: plant, nurse, sea, and earth.
The ensuing battle ends as abruptly as it began, with Marinell suffering a
“mortall” wound, and Britomart continuing her journey without concern
for the wounded: “The martiall Mayd stayd not him to lament” (III.4.17,
18). The epic assertion of bounded selfhood leaves no room for compassion.
We see in the case of Marinell that the defense of psychic as well as
bodily boundaries reproduces the violence needed to maintain those
boundaries. In this regard, Marinell allegorizes the paradox that self-protection—avoiding the vulnerability of love—requires an adversarial way
of being that exposes one to more, not less, violence. Fearing Proteus’s
“prophecy” that “of a woman he should haue much ill,” Marinell, at the
behest of his mother, “euer from fayre Ladies loue did fly” so as to avoid
the deep wounds that love can make (III.4.25-26). In this sense, Marinell,
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although rarely the focus of scholarly inquiry, best reveals the symptomatic logic of the friendship legend as one bent on fashioning virtuous subjects through violence. This self-defeating logic is exemplified by Marinell’s
mother, Cymoent, about whom Spenser states: “So weening to haue arm’d
him, she did quite disarme” (III.4.27). Marinell’s vulnerability makes clear
that bounded subjects do not reduce the need for violence. On the contrary, Marinell’s exposure to violence is a direct result of his opposition to
love’s enervating force. Whereas the former violence leads to death without
community (“The martiall Mayd stayd not him to lament”), the latter gathers bodies together through a shared vulnerability and openness to others.
What makes Marinell’s story so significant, then, is that he multiplies
love’s attachments by making the violence and vulnerability of love the basis for friendly community. Spenser imagines this form of violence as a
kind of elemental fragility shared among individuals—both human and
nonhuman—and so shifts the optic of his poem away from the seacoast
locale of Britomart’s benthic imaginary to the “seas abundant progeny,” of
which Marinell is one. Turning to Book IV, we find that the appearance of
Marinell marks not so much the cessation of Britomart’s benthic imaginary
as its multiplication and refraction among friends.

III. Marinell and the Legend of Friendship
In “Friendship as a Way of Life,” Foucault argues that the problem of love
(or homosexuality more specifically) “is not to discover in oneself the truth
of one’s sex, but, rather, to use one’s sexuality henceforth to arrive at a multiplicity of relationships.” To treat sexuality “not [as] a form of desire but
[as] something desirable,” Foucault suggests, means “to invent, from A to
Z, a relationship that is still formless, which is friendship.”26 Although numerous critics have pointed to the often surprising overlaps and tensions
between love and friendship in The Faerie Queene,27 I reference Foucault’s
definition of friendship in order to highlight a key aspect of Spenserian
ontology that scholars have yet fully to remark upon: namely, the linkage in
Spenser’s poetry between love (amare) and the sea (mare) has consequences for all relationships in which acknowledgment of likeness (homo-geneity) overcomes difference and hierarchy (hetero-geneity). In the Legend
of Friendship, we see the literalization of Foucault’s idea of friendship as
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a “way of life”—whereby “life itself ” becomes a type of wending, journeying, erring condition of human agency—in the marriage of two rivers. In
Canto 11, Spenser turns his allegorical gaze to the Thames and the Medway
rivers, for whom “all the Sea-gods and their fruitfull seede, / In honour of
the spousalls,” are gathered together (IV.11.8). Enacting the epithalamion
genre’s signature traits of sexual violence and heteronormativity,28 Spenser
not only changes the sex of the Medway river, as noted by A. C. Hamilton,29
but also depicts a scene in which the “proud Nymph” “relent[s]” to the
Thames’s sexual advances:
Long had the Thames (as we in records reed)
Before that day her wooed to his bed;
But the proud Nymph would for no wordly meed,
Nor no entreatie to his loue be led;
Till now at last relenting, she to him was wed. (IV.11.8)
The Oxford English Dictionary defines “relent” as a type of bodily melting, from the Anglo-Norman word relenter, meaning “to melt, slacken,
give up.” Although in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries “relent” could
be used interchangeably to mean either “to relinquish or abandon a resolution or course of action” or “to dissolve into water,” Spenser capitalizes on
both meanings by portraying the marriage of the two rivers as a loss of will,
a “relenting” on the part of the Nymph. While common enough within
the genre of epithalamic poetry, the coercive nature of the rivers’ union,
whose sexual telos is signaled by the rhyming of “bed,” “led,” and “wed,”
serves here to remind the reader of Florimell’s capture by Proteus in Book
III and to prefigure the marriage between Florimell and Marinell in Book
IV. Regarding the former, Proteus captures Florimell after having rescued
her from the “Fishers wandring bote” (III.8.31). He then takes her to his
underwater “bowre” deep “in the bottom of the maine,” where he “make[s]
him selfe a mortall wight,” and “like a Faerie knight him selfe he drest; / For
euery shape on him he could endew” (III.8.37, 39-41). Infinitely changeable, Proteus cannot, however, change Florimell’s heart, since “Eternall
thraldome was to her more liefe, / Then losse of chastitie, or chaunge of
love” (III.8.42). Unable to win Florimell’s affections through friendship,
Proteus turns to violent force: “Down in a Dongeon deepe he let her fall, /
And threatned there to make her his eternall thrall” (III.8.41).
Thus the marriage of the two rivers is not only a reminder of Florimell’s
capture by Proteus; more importantly, it is a recapitulation of the violence
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that Florimell endures over the course of two Books. The model of relationality thus allegorized by the two rivers is one in which domination and
loss of will are essential to the instrumentalization of friendship for the
purpose of marriage. No doubt it is for this reason that scholars keen on investigating the erotic impulses of Book III have little to say about Florimell
and Marinell, who seem to conform all too well to C.S. Lewis’s influential
assertion that the direction of love in Spenser’s allegory is the marriage
bed.30 The Legend of Friendship binds the erotic excesses of Book III by
fashioning subjects whose ultimate purpose is—so the story goes—to “relent” to the marriage plot.
And yet there is another possibility for reading the language of “relenting” in the Legend of Friendship. In this second reading, the rivers do not
just prefigure the marriage of Florimell and Marinell; they represent the
more-than-human possibilities for thinking friendship in Spenser’s allegory. Just as we have seen Spenser “melt” in relation to Ralegh, and Britomart
in relation to the sea, so the marriage of the Thames and Medway rivers
enables us to imagine forms of relationality beyond the strictures of domination, utilization, and heteronormativity. Read literally (as Spenser’s allegory no doubt invites us to do) “relenting” serves not only to connect
Spenser’s liquid poetics to the discourse of friendship but to multiply love’s
intensities in places where, in Foucault’s words, “there is supposed to be
only law, rule, or habit.”
Consider Florimell’s complaint at the end of Book IV. Imprisoned in
Proteus’s “dongeon deepe,” and “bound” by “chaynes” (IV.11.2-3), Florimell
provides the visual and topographic obverse of the wedding ceremony by
literalizing—in “chaynes”—the rivers’ “spousalls” bonds:
Yet loe the seas I see by often beating,
Doe pearce the rockes, and hardest marble weares;
But his hard rocky hart for no entreating
Will yeeld, but when my piteous plaints he heares,
Is hardned more with my aboundant teares.
Yet though he neuer list to me relent,
But let me waste in woe my wretched yeares,
Yet will I neuer of my loue repent,
But ioy that for his sake I suffer imprisonment. (IV.12.7)
At its extreme, Spenser suggests, the fashioning of virtue through friendship leads to bondage and imprisonment; for Florimell, however, more
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disconcerting than Proteus’s stony prison is the imprisonment she suffers
due to Marinell’s “rocky hart,” to which “no entreating / Will yeeld,” and
which, unlike “marble” or “stone,” not even the “seas” rough “beating” can
“pearce.” For Florimell, love is a prison, “So had [she] rather to be thrall,
then free” (IV.12.10). Echoing Britomart’s complaint in Book III, Florimell
draws a negative comparison between Marinell’s “rocky hart” and the rock
that confines her, stating that whereas the latter yields in time to the heaving of the sea, Marinell, by contrast, “when my piteous plaints he heares
/ Is hardned more with my aboundant teares.” An imaginary more lithic
than benthic, Florimell contrasts love’s oceanic bodies (her own) with the
mineralized and militarized bodies of epic. And yet, what appears at first
as antinomy soon gives way to bodily mingling as the stone that surrounds
Florimell “relents” to her “lamentable voice”:
So feeling her case she did complaine,
That ruth it moued in the rocky stone,
And made it seeme to feele her grieuous paine,
And oft to grone with billowes beating from the maine. (IV.12.5)
From stone that confines to stone that moves in fellow feeling for its captive’s
“greuious paine,” Florimell’s Orphic song imagines a lithic love in which
“rocky stone” relents—that is, dissolves—becoming more lively by sharing in Florimell’s pain. By entering into sympathetic union with Florimell,
the stone becomes a thrall to her emotion, but one with more animation
and agency than those, like Marinell, who fashion “rocky hart[s].”31 Hence
Florimell’s paradox: “Such thraldome or such freedome.” To be a thrall to
love is to be free; Florimell shares this e-motional freedom, “or” this bondage, with the elements of rock and sea.
When Marinell hears Florimell’s complaint, he too “relent[s]”:
All which complaint when Marinell had heard,
And vnderstood the cause of all her care
To come of him, for vsing her so hard,
His stubborne heart, that neuer felt misfare
Was toucht with soft remorse and pitty rare;
That euen for griefe of minde he oft did grone,
...
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Thus whilst his stony heart with tender ruth
Was toucht, and mighty courage mollifide,
Dame Venus sonne that tameth stubbore youth
With iron bit, and maketh him abide,
Till like a victor on his backe he ride,
Into his mouth his maystring briddle threw,
That made him stoupe, till he did him bestride:
Then gan he make him tread his steps anew,
And learne to loue, by learning louer paines to rew. (IV.12.12-13)
Recalling the ecological assemblage of image-plant-heart that grafts
Britomart’s melancholy to Guyon and Glauce, and later the sea, Marinell’s
encounter with Florimell’s voice brings him into sympathetic union with the
elements: his “stony heart” was with “tender ruth / . . . toucht”; it “moued”
in unison with the “rocky stone.” And like the stone that cries out “with billows beating,” he too “for griefe of minde . . . did grone.” For the first time
in Marinell’s journey, he experiences pain without purpose of utility; his
“ruth” is not secondary to the pains of self-fashioning but rather integral to
the unbounded being that he is (becoming). Marinell becomes a thrall to
love, so much so that he too appears bound and bridled by “Venus sonne.”
This inhuman assemblage of voice-rock-sea-and-horse shifts the optic of
Spenser’s allegory away from the bounded body of (human) self-fashioning
toward a different understanding of the homo: for with Marinell, it is the
relation of difference and sameness indicated by his very name (Marinell
is a composite of both masculine and feminine nouns—marin, marine—
and land and sea, since marine refers to tidelands) that links his capacity
to feel pain to the elements that pass through him, which are not exterior
but rather animate his every movement. In Spenser’s hands, this sense of
homo-ness—of being composed by the same matter as rock and sea that
goes beyond man (homo) toward intimacy with inhuman beings suggests
a different kind of friendship, one at odds with the regulatory norms of a
marriage plot premised on sexual difference, conquest, and hierarchy.
Tamed by “Venus sonne,” Marinell succumbs to “louers paines” and to a
melancholy that consumes his every thought: “In solitary silence far from
wight, / He gan record the lamentable stowre, / In which his wretched loue
lay day and night, / For his deare sake that ill deseru’d that plight” (IV.12.19).
Like Britomart before him, Marinell “record[s]” his melancholy by engraving Florimell’s memory directly on his heart: “The thought whereof
empierst his hart so deepe, / That of no worldly thing he tooke delight; /
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Ne dayly food did take, ne nightly sleepe, / But payn’d, and mourn’d, and
languisht, and alone did weepe” (IV.12.19). Alone, consumed by melancholy, the Marinell we see in Book IV is the semblance of the knight whom
Britomart left alone on the beach, friendless and without care, but with the
following difference: when Cymoent sees her son Marinell, “vnable once to
stirre or moue,” she at first rebukes the sea-god Tryphon for failing to heal
his “former fatall wound,” and seeks a final cure for his “new languishment”
(IV.12.23). When no cure can be found for the “loue” that “afflict[s] his engrieued mind,” she too relents (IV.12.25). By rejecting Proteus’s prophecy,
which ruled against love, Cymoent becomes a friend to her son not despite
their shared affliction but because of it; in so doing, she makes of friendship a means for maximizing, not abstaining from, the most intense and
corporeal experience of love as a shattering of boundaries:
That Florimell it was, which wrought his paine,
She gan a fresh to chafe, and grieue in euery vaine.
Yet since she saw the streight extremitie,
In which his life vnluckily was layd,
It was no time to scan the prophecie,
Whether old Proteus true or false had sayd,
That his decay should happen by a mayd.
It’s late in death of daunger to aduize,
Or loue forbid him, that is life denayd:
But rather gan in troubled mind deuize,
How she that Ladies libertie might enterprize. (IV.12.27-28)
The “libertie” to love Marinell made Florimell a prisoner to Proteus’s desire; hearing this, both Marinell and Cymoent become thralls to this
“mayd” whose affliction they share: “Or loue forbid him, that is life denayd” (IV.12.28). The “life denayd” to Marinell is not only his mortal life
but also Florimell’s; his “extremitie” is her imprisonment.
But the “relenting” that we see between Florimell, Marinell, and Cymoent
is altogether different from the “relenting” prescribed by Proteus, who understands friendship as a means of giving way on one’s desires, whether
through discipline or through violent coercion. By contrast, the “relenting”
that Cymoent undergoes for her son and for Florimell at the end of Book
IV is more like the “drops of melting love” that Spenser describes in reference to Elizabeth, namely, an anonymous and involuntary state of being
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dissolved through non-mastery. Just as the anonymous elements of stone
and sea move with pity, so Cymoent, whose provenance is the sea, moves
with e-motion for the “mayd” whose suffering she shares. Such voluntary
relinquishment of the autonomy and self-determination celebrated by epic
rests on a shared vulnerability in which boundaries are not so much overcome as recognized as permeable and phantasmatic from the beginning.
This version of friendship, in which one individual relents to another
not by sacrificing one’s will but by sacrificing one’s wish for autonomy, runs
counter to the Friendship Legend’s previous episodes where the body’s inhuman composition is cordoned off by the imperative to fashion impenetrable subjects. Consider the following scene of martial combat in which
the collision of warlike bodies produces an ecological milieu at once coextensive with the bodies rendered and separate:
As when two billowes in the Irish sowndes,
Forcibly driuen with contrarie tydes,
Do meete together, each abacke rebowndes
With roaring rage; and dashing on all sides,
That filleth all the sea with fome, diuydes
The doubtfull current into diuers wayes:
So fell those two in spight of both their prydes,
But Scudamour himself did soon vprayse,
And mounting light his foe for lying long vpbrayes. (IV.1.42)
When Paridell attacks Scudamour, he does so out “of friendship” for
Blandamour, who reasons: “That as I late aduentured for your sake, / The
hurts whereof me now from battell stay, / Ye will me now with like good
turne repay” (IV.1.40). In the friendship economy defined by Blandamour,
friends assume “hurts” only if it is profitable to do so based on their individual interests. As bounded individuals, Blandamour and Paridell agree
to risk their autonomy so as to establish greater autonomy through the
unequal distribution of bodily suffering. Consequently, when Paridell “of
friendship” competes with Scudamour, they do so as “two billowes” moving with “contrarie tydes,” who with “roaring rage . . . diuydes / The doubtfull current into diuers wayes.” Although Spenser once again shifts the optic of his poem to visualize friendship in a nonhuman register, he does so
from the vantage of an oblique simile: “As when.” The distance surmounted
by Spenser simile—between human events on the one hand, and nonhuman events on the other—remains the focus of the analogy, such that we
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are meant to recognize the divisions between self and sea (“the sea with
fome, diuydes”) over and above their continuities. These knights whose
“prydes” multiply their injuries remain too prideful to relent to each other’s
suffering.
Cymoent, by contrast, does not give way on her desires only to further her self interest; nor does she prize greater autonomy as the telos of
friendship. Instead, Cymoent lets herself be undone by her affections; she
relents to an internal force that seeks amity rather than enmity. Like the
suffering shared between Britomart and the sea, and Florimell and the
“rocky stone,” Cymoent melts with fellow-feeling. When we reach the end
of the Friendship Legend, this mutuality of feeling, or this indifference to
the other’s difference, crosses the ontological boundaries between nymph
and mortal “wight” to enfold all three:
Right so himselfe did Marinell vpreare,
When he in place his dearest loue did spy,
And though his limbs could not his bodie beare,
Ne former strength returne so suddenly,
Yet chearefull signes he shewed outwardly.
Ne less was she in secret hart affected. (IV.12.35)
When Marinell rises to meet Florimell, “though his limbs could not his
bodie beare,” we read that he does so like a plant: Marinell turns to his
friend, “As withered weed through cruell winters tine, / That feeles the
warmth of sunny beames reflection, / Liftes vp his head, that did before
decline / And gins to spread his leafe before the faire sunshine” (IV.12.34).
Here the distance travelled by Spenser’s simile is not called into question by
warring subjects. Instead, Spenser invites us to read Marinell’s “chearefull
signes” materially, heliotropically, and errantly—as signs of life.
If, as I have argued above, scholars of early modern sexuality have tended to neglect Marinell and Florimell due to their supposed predictability
and conventionality in comparison with the amorous “play” of Book III,
then what I wish to underscore here is just how counterintuitive and unpredictable is a marriage that collates the diverse materialities of humannymph-rock-plant-and-sea. Unlike the marriage between the two rivers,
which turns gendered difference into a loss of will, and unlike the battle
between Paridell and Scudamour, which instrumentalizes friendship for
personal gain, the concord achieved between Marinell and Florimell is
conventional only in the most capacious sense of the word convention: a
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concordance structurally shared by all. The friendship that we witness at
the end of the Book IV between Marinell and Florimell is as much hetero
as it is homo, in Foucault’s sense. And that is because the entanglements
wrought by love, far from abating after Book III, proliferate along vectors
of friendship that link what is hetero—self versus other—to a much denser,
more perverse fabric of life and materiality.
Spenser’s liquid poetics thus enables us to read signs like “relent” both
doubly and materially: not just as an expression of a Protestant morality
aimed at fashioning proper subjects; but as a literal manifestation of the
fragility “we” share with inhuman ecologies. In Spenser’s liquid poetics,
signs such as Marinell’s are best read athwart of human ontology, as vital
signs; they are as innumerable, and as errant, as the sea’s abundant seed.
Brown University
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